“As a net is made up
of a series of ties, so everything in this world is connected by a
series of ties. If anyone thinks that the mesh of a net is an
independent, isolated thing, he is mistaken.”
-
Buddha
Microchimerism is the existence of a
low concentration of genetically distinct cells within a person.
Macrochimerism is the same, but the concentration of genetically
distinct cells is greater (upward of 2.5%) and said cells may
comprise an entire organ of the body, such as the gonads.
It is caused by pregnancy (wherein
there is a transfer of cells between: the mother and child, no matter
whether the baby miscarries, is terminated or is born; and between
residual cells of an older sibling and the child), twinning (where
one twin is absorbed by the other twin in the uterus), unprotected
sex, blood transfusions, and organ transplants. As a consequence,
virtually everyone is at least microchimeric, possibly with several
different types of genetically distinct cells within them. (It is ironic then that, in 2005, the Human Chimera Prohibition Bill was introduced before Congress. It was not passed. If it had been, it would have created an awkward scenario in which seemingly every single person would be in violation.)
This poses a number of practical and
legal issues.
From a practical standpoint, how is one
supposed to artfully pick a mate? Attraction is at some level a
consequence of one's compatibility with another's immunity profile
(and, in association, with their genetic profile). This is
communicated subconsciously via pheromones and consciously by one's
observable phenotype. So, if we carefully read these genetic cues and
select a mate that has a genetic profile that complements (and would
seemingly combine with) our own to produce the best possible
offspring, aren't we then severely duped if the mate we chose turns
out to be macrochimeric and the genetic material s/he contributes to
the offspring is completely different to the genetic material we
observed and selected?
From a legal perspective, some of the
problems have already been pondered. The most oft raised problem
being: what if we clear rapists because we test their DNA from a
blood sample and that DNA does not match the semen DNA found on the
victim, but then it turns out that they are incorrectly cleared
because, in truth, they are the perpetrator but they are just
macrochimeric, so that their blood cell DNA is entirely different to
their semen cell DNA? Do we need to start asking those accused of
rape to provide semen samples rather than blood samples? This might
be the only way to ensure that perpetrators are not accidentally
vindicated. However, requiring someone to masturbate in order to
produce a semen sample, would seem to amount to an affront to the
accused's human rights.
But the objective of this blog has
always been to canvass issues that, to my knowledge, are yet to have
been conceptualized and addressed. Thus, I will rather focus on a
legal problem that revolves around a legal consequence of chimerism
that is yet to have been pondered, namely the ability to provide
informed consent for the use of, and the ability to claim
intellectual property rights in, one's DNA when one is in fact
comprised of many genetically distinct cells, including: the cells of
one's mother's, and the cells of one or more of one's lover(s), older
siblings and children.
Do we have the right to give informed
consent for the use of any of our cells, and to claim IP rights in
any of our cells, or only our primary DNA cells (i.e. not the small
percentage of chimeric cells)?
Let me preface the ensuing discussion
with the acknowledgement that the case of Moore v Regents of the
University of California established that consent to an operation
to have tissue removed entails an abandonment of any claims over the
removed tissue. Thus, Moore had no IP rights in his hairy cell
leukemia cells after they had been removed by Goode (a doctor
employed by the University of California). But, it is my contention
that this is not the end of the story. Bioethicists still argue that
patients should be offered compensation for their donation of waste
tissue by a fixed fee or a chance to share in the rewards of
financially successful research. This discussion in set to heat in
the wake of the worldwide spate of Myriad Genetics cases, regarding
the patentability of gene sequences. So, the ensuing discussion is
based on the assumption that, at some point, the law could be
modified such that people will be entitled to compensation for their
DNA.
With this disclaimer, I continue...
Henrietta Lacks died of cervical cancer
in the 1950's. Without her knowledge or consent, her cervical cancer
cells (dubbed HeLa cells) were taken and reproduced in a laboratory,
to amass numbers sufficient enough for sale and worldwide
experimentation (resulting in huge financial gains for all concerned,
except Henrietta or her descendents). In theory, this should not
occur today, as doctors are now required to get informed consent
before taking and experimenting on cell samples. But, in reality, the
same exact outcome could occur if someone gave informed consent for
the use of their chimeric cells for experimentation, but the person
who is principally comprised of those cells (either the offspring, or
the mother, or the organ donor etc) has not consented. In such a
case, just as Henrietta Lacks (or her children, after her death) had
no control over the use of her DNA for experimentation, the person
who is principally comprised of the chimeric cells, would have no
control over the use of their DNA.
This has been an issue with regard to
identical twins (that have near identical DNA). As it stands, one
twin can consent to the provision of a cell sample, which means the
identical twin is subjected to the consequences even though he/she
may not have agreed with the provision of consent. These consequences
include privacy issues with respect to the revelation of the twin's
DNA profile, psychological issues with respect to (as happened with
Henrietta Lack's offspring) the emotional trauma of envisioning their
mother's cells becoming immortal and being blown up or otherwise
subject to experimentation, and the financial issues of remuneration.
Previous complexities in the issues of
consent and compensation as they applied to identical twins are now
far more wide reaching. If it is not just identical twins that share
cells of near identical DNA, but virtually all of us who do, then the
problem of obtaining consent and compensating rightful parties
escalates.
It cannot be that consent can only be
provided, and rights claimed in, the primary DNA cells as this is
incongruous with both precedence and reality. When cancerous cells
are taken for experimentation, the DNA of those cells has mutated
such that the cancerous cells differ from the primary DNA cells of
the person. Despite this, it has never been argued that, because the
cancerous cells are genetically distinct from the primary DNA cells
of the person, that person cannot provide consent for the use and
experimentation of the cancerous cells. How could this be argued?
Practically, those cancerous cells comprise part of the person and so
are his/hers over which to provide consent. Equally, it would be very
difficult to limit a person's right to give consent to (and
potentially claim intellectual property rights in) their chimeric
cells. After all, those cells comprise part of the person.
Thus, it seems the only answer is for
us to acknowledge our interconnectedness, and construct the law in
such a way as to respect people's rights to privacy, self
determination and compensation as best as possible.
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